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Abstract
We model competition between risk-neutral principals who hire weakly risk-averse
agents to produce a good of variable quality. The agent can increase the likelihood of
producing a high-quality good by providing costly eﬀort. We demonstrate that, when
the agent is strictly risk-averse, the cost of providing incentives increases in the number
of other ﬁrms in the industry. We characterize conditions under which the ﬁrst-best
outcome involves each ﬁrm inducing high eﬀort. We then consider ﬁrms in competition,
and identify parameter conditions under which (i) each ﬁrm induces high eﬀort in the
short run and low eﬀort in the long run (ii) the ﬁrst-best outcome has each ﬁrm inducing
high eﬀort, but long-run equilibrium results in each ﬁrm inducing low eﬀort. Thus, in
the long run, the average quality in the industry deteriorates, and increased competition
leads to a “race to the bottom” in quality.1 Introduction
Should social policy encourage competition in service industries? The answer appears to
be “yes,” judging from the deregulation of ﬁnancial markets (the National Market System),
competitive provision of directory assistance in the UK or the plethora of subprime mort-
gage brokers. However, is there an economic basis for this argument? This question is of
immediate importance because the service industry is so large: In the U.S., it accounts for
approximately two-thirds of domestic production.
Some recent experiences suggest that competition in service sectors has not been ex-
emplary. For example, Propper, Burgess and Gossage (2003) examine the reforms of the
National Health Service in the UK. Using quality measures (such as mortality) they ﬁnd a
negative relationship between quality and the degree of competition. Similarly, a National
Audit Oﬃce Report on the privatization of Britain’s directory enquiry services in Novem-
ber 2003 concluded that, initially, the proportion of accurately provided telephone numbers
was only 62%. While this improved to 86% over a year, usage had fallen oﬀ dramatically,
especially in the over-55 age group. Meanwhile, competition had increased substantially: A
year after the privatization, as many as 217 directory enquiry numbers were in service.
The standard argument in favor of competition is that, ﬁxing a production technology
and factor prices, free entry drives ﬁrms to produce at the minimum of the long run cost
curve, which is socially eﬃcient. In service industries, the good being produced is typically
intangible and depends on the interaction of agents. Indeed, there is no reason to view the
“cost function” as invariant to market structure, an idea fundamental to the eﬃciency of
competitive equilibrium. As we show, competition can change the cost of producing high
quality services, rendering the notion of “the minimum of the long run average cost curve”
specious.
We present a simple model of an industry in which risk-neutral principals oﬀer incentive
contracts to agents. If an agent puts in high eﬀort, the good produced is more likely to be of
high quality. A monopsonist consumer observes the quality oﬀered by each ﬁrm. She then
chooses a ﬁrm to patronize and buys a ﬁxed amount. In our model there are therefore two
contractible states. We derive the optimal contract between the principal and the agent,
and show that, with a risk-averse agent, the cost of inducing high eﬀort depends on the
structure of the industry. In particular, it increases with both the number of high-eﬀort
ﬁrms and the number of low-eﬀort ﬁrms in the industry.
We then consider ﬁrst-best outcomes, in which ﬁrms can directly contract on eﬀort and
therefore are not subject to an incentive problem. We show that, if the monetary cost
of high eﬀort is suﬃciently low, the ﬁrst-best outcome has only high-eﬀort ﬁrms in the
1industry. Although quality is stochastic, an industry with only high-eﬀort ﬁrms will have a
high expected or average quality.
We consider two types of competitive equilibria — short run, in which the number of
ﬁrms is ﬁxed, and long run, with free entry of ﬁrms. In the latter, ﬁrms make close to
zero proﬁts (modulo an integer number of entrants). We focus on the case in which all
ﬁrms optimally induce high eﬀort in the short run. As the number of ﬁrms in the industry
increases, the incentive (in terms of an increase in expected revenue) to incurring costly eﬀort
decreases. Further, if the agent is risk-averse, the cost to providing incentives increases. This
is because competition can make the contracting problem between the principal and agent
more noisy: An agent can fail to make a sale either because he shirked or because he faced
an aggressive competitor. Both of these eﬀects go in the same direction; for an identiﬁed
set of parameter values, there is eventually a race to the bottom in long-run equilibrium,
with each ﬁrm providing low eﬀort. As a result, the average quality of services produced in
the industry degenerates. The more risk-averse the agent (so the more severe the incentive
problem), the sooner competitive forces drive the economy toward low eﬀort.
In an example we show that a stark divergence between the short run and the long run
can occur even when the agent is risk-neutral. With a risk-neutral agent, it is costless for
the principal in the ﬁrm to align incentives. Thus, a wedge between ﬁrst-best and long-run
equilibrium is created solely due to excess entry in the latter. When the agent is risk-averse,
the additional factor of compensating the agent for bearing risk leads to a quicker divergence
from the ﬁrst-best outcome.
Our model is more appropriate for service than manufacturing industries. First, we
assume an immediate link between agent eﬀort and product quality. The service sector is
more consistent with ﬂexible quality choice: It is more diﬃcult to upgrade a car factory
than it is to provide incentives for better service. Second, only the consumer knows the
quality of the good. By nature, services are experience goods: It is easier to measure a car’s
attributes than to determine if a waiter was polite. Third, we do not explicitly consider price
competition. Unlike the market for widgets, decreasing price in services industries does not
automatically lead to increased market share, since the price may signal the quality of the
product.
The previous literature on the eﬀect of product market competition on managerial incen-
tives largely takes the industry structure as exogenous, with the exception of Raith (2003),
which we discuss later. Early work in this area includes Hart (1983), who provides a model
in which competition reduces managerial slack by making it easier (i.e., cheaper) to provide
the agent with incentives to put in high eﬀort. Scharfstein (1988) demonstrates that Hart’s
result relies critically on a discontinuity in the utility function. With a continuous utility
2function and a strictly risk-averse agent, competition exacerbates the incentive problem, as
in our model.
In Hart (1983) and Scharfstein (1988) contracts only on an individual ﬁrm’s absolute
performance, rather than its relative performance in the industry. Holmstrom (1982) and
Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983) point out that, if output in an industry is correlated, then an
important beneﬁt of competition is the ability to base the agent’s compensation on her
relative performance. An immediate implication is that a monopolist would beneﬁt from
hiring multiple agents to generate more information. Unlike their frameworks, in our model,
the industrial structure (i.e., one principal matched with one agent) is not ineﬃcient per
se: while a monopolist might internalize the market revenue externality we present, it could
not arrange production more cheaply than a series of isolated principal-agent pairs.
Hermalin (1992) considers a manager oﬀering a contract to shareholders (so the man-
ager’s participation constraint clearly does not bind). He demonstrates that competition
has an ambiguous eﬀect on managerial incentives: Competition may change the relative
payoﬀ of actions, and may induce the manager to consume diﬀerent amounts of perquisites.
He also identiﬁes a “risk-adjustment” eﬀect that arises because competition may change
the informativeness of the agent’s action. In our model, increased competition decreases
the informativeness of an agent’s action, which therefore requires a risk premium. This
increased cost to the competing principals aﬀects their equilibrium quality choice.
Schmidt (1997) considers the eﬀect of competition on managerial incentives to reduce
costs with a risk-neutral manager who incurs a utility cost if the ﬁrm goes bankrupt. Com-
petition is modelled in reduced form, via a parameter in a ﬁrm’s demand function. Increased
competition increases the likelihood of a ﬁrm going under, so the manager works harder in
an eﬀort to stave oﬀ the personal cost of bankruptcy. Thus, increased competition unam-
biguously reduces the cost to implementing a higher level of eﬀort. However, the marginal
beneﬁt of cost reduction (i.e., greater eﬀort) is ambiguous in sign, and may decrease as
competition increases. The tradeoﬀ between these two eﬀects implies that competition may
sometimes lead to lower eﬀort. Notably, in his model, if the participation constraint of a
manager is binding (i.e., if managers in a competitive industry are not “scarce”), increased
competition unambiguously leads to greater eﬀort provision. In our model, the participa-
tion constraint always binds as employees are not scarce, yet we obtain the opposite result:
with a risk-averse agent, competition increases the cost of providing incentives.
An important point of departure for our paper from the literature cited so far is that we
endogenize the structure of the industry, by considering a Nash equilibrium in which each
ﬁrm optimally chooses its eﬀort level (i.e., its contract) in response to the choices of other
ﬁrms in the market. This enables a direct comparison of the ﬁrst-best structure with the
3outcome of a long-run equilibrium with free entry.
A closely related paper is Raith (2003), which models entry and exit of ﬁrms on a circle.
Each ﬁrm consists of a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent. Production costs are
decreasing in the unobservable eﬀort exerted by an agent. However, as Raith assumes that
realized costs are directly contractible, and any noise in the mapping from eﬀort to cost is
independent across ﬁrms, the cost of providing incentives is independent of the degree of
competition. Rather, only the beneﬁt to inducing a particular level of eﬀort changes with
changes in competition. By contrast, we ﬁnd that the cost of inducing a particular quality
level in the optimal contract depends on the market structure. Indeed, the cost of inducing
high eﬀort is increasing in the number of competing ﬁrms.
We brieﬂy outline our model in Section 2. We present the optimal contract and expected
cost of inducing high eﬀort to the principal in Section 3. We demonstrate that, when the
agent is risk-averse, the cost of inducing high eﬀort is increasing in the number of other
competing ﬁrms. We establish the ﬁrst-best benchmark in Section 4, and identify conditions
under which the ﬁrst-best outcome consists of only high eﬀort ﬁrms. Essentially, the cost
of eﬀort to an agent must be suﬃciently low. The eﬀects of competition, in both the short
and long run, are examined in Section 5. We establish conditions under which long run
competition (with free entry) deviates from the ﬁrst-best. Broadly, these include the agent
being suﬃciently risk-averse. However, as we demonstrate via an example in Section 5.1,
even with a risk-neutral agent, free entry can undermine a ﬁrm’s willingness to induce high
eﬀort, due to a decreased beneﬁt of eﬀort.
2 Model
An industry with n ≥ 1 ﬁrms provides a service that can be of variable quality. Each ﬁrm
is owned by a risk-neutral principal who contracts with an agent (an employee) to produce
the service. The employee chooses eﬀort e ∈ {eh,e`}. The quality of the service oﬀered
depends on the eﬀort level: high eﬀort yields high quality with probability q, while low
eﬀort yields high quality with probability 1−q, where q > 1
2. Agents are all identical. Each
agent is weakly risk-averse with a utility function over wealth denoted by u(·). The agent
has a reservation wage w0 that gives rise to a reservation utility u0 = u(w0). His utility is
separable in wealth and the cost of eﬀort. Let g(·) denote the inverse function of u(·).
Let e0 denotes the monetary cost to the agent of high eﬀort and eu denotes the agent’s
disutility of exerting high eﬀort. Then, eu = u(w0 + e0) − u(w0). Low eﬀort entails zero
cost, and generates no disutility.
The service is purchased by a representative customer. She observes the quality of the
4good oﬀered by each ﬁrm, and spends y at one randomly chosen high-quality ﬁrm. (A
constant revenue is consistent with a game in which the consumer has beliefs on quality
given prices, coupled with arbitrary small costs of sequential searching. Her optimal strategy
is as follows: If a price signals low quality, she moves on and buys from the ﬁrst high quality
ﬁrm she ﬁnds. Firms then have no incentive to reduce price.1) The principal cannot observe
the quality of the service experienced by each customer, but does observe the sales revenue
generated by her employee.
Thus, in our model, are two possible revenue states that the principal can observe: a
high outcome, y, or a low one, which we normalize to zero.2 Corresponding to the two
revenue states, there are two wage levels she optimally oﬀers, designated as wh and w`
respectively. Thus, the contract oﬀered by the principal is deﬁned by (wh,w`). We assume
that w0,e0 > 0, and w0 + e0 ≤ qy, so that a monopolist facing no incentive problem has a
non-negative expected proﬁt if it induces high eﬀort.
Let ph denote the probability of achieving high revenue (y) when the agent puts in
a high eﬀort, and p` the corresponding probability when he chooses low eﬀort. That is,
ph = Pr(y | eh), and p` = Pr(y | e`). From the viewpoint of a single ﬁrm, ph and p` are
exogenous. However, the probabilities depend on the quality choices of the other ﬁrms.
To see this, consider an arbitrary ﬁrm i, and suppose that the industry consists of nh
other ﬁrms (i.e., not including ﬁrm i) that provide high eﬀort, and n` other ﬁrms that
produce low eﬀort. Suppose that ﬁrm i provides high eﬀort. The consumer will purchase
from a ﬁrm only if it produces high quality. She randomizes with equal probability across
all high-quality ﬁrms. If ﬁrm i has high eﬀort, it produces high quality with probability q.
Suppose exactly k of the other nh+n` in the industry also produce high quality. The event
that exactly k of the other nh + n` ﬁrms have high quality has probability
























Further, if ﬁrm i generates high quality and exactly k of the remaining ﬁrms also gen-
erate high quality, the consumer buys from ﬁrm i with probability 1
k+1. Thus, the overall
1For example, the 2005 NAO study on Britain’s directory enquiry numbers found that 80% of the market
share belonged to two numbers that charged on average 30% more than the previous regulated price, and
price competition was limited by consumer’s inability to ﬁnd the best price.
2A generalization to a strictly positive low outcome is straightforward.







If, instead, ﬁrm i provides low eﬀort, it generates high quality with a lower probability,
1 − q. However, the probability distribution over the information that the consumer gets
from the other nh + n` ﬁrms is independent of the eﬀort of ﬁrm i. Therefore,










Notice that, if there are no other ﬁrms in the industry, ph(0,0) = q and p`(0,0) = 1 − q.
The expected revenue of ﬁrm i is ph(nh,n`)y if it has high eﬀort and p`(nh,n`)y if
it has low eﬀort. We show that (as is intuitive), the expected revenue declines as the
industry grows more competitive via the entry of either high or low eﬀort ﬁrms. That is,
the probability that ﬁrm i earns a high revenue declines in both nh and n`. Importantly,
the diﬀerence between ph and p`, which represents the marginal beneﬁt to ﬁrm i of inducing
high eﬀort, also declines as the industry becomes more competitive.
Lemma 1 The probabilities ph(nh,n`) and p`(nh,n`) are both strictly decreasing in nh and
n`, as is the diﬀerence ph(nh,n`) − p`(nh,n`).
Proofs of all results are relegated to the Appendix, in Section 7.
We turn to an examination of industry structure on the cost to a ﬁrm of inducing high
eﬀort.
3 Cost of High Eﬀort and the Employee Risk Premium
Suppose that the principal wishes to induce low eﬀort. Then, she must pay the agent enough
for him to achieve the reservation utility u0. Since the principal is risk-neutral, risk-sharing
is not beneﬁcial. Thus, an optimal low-eﬀort contract has the agent earning the wage w0
in both states. If the agent is strictly risk-averse, this is the unique optimal contract when
low eﬀort is induced.
By contrast, suppose the principal wishes to induce high eﬀort. The optimal contract
minimizes the cost of doing so, and speciﬁes a wage in the high revenue state, wh, and the
low, w`, that are the solution to the problem:
minwh,w` phwh + (1 − ph)w`
6subject to : phu(wh) + (1 − ph)u(w`) − eu ≥ p`u(wh) + (1 − p`)u(w`) (1)
phu(wh) + (1 − ph)u(w`) − eu ≥ u0, (2)
where (1) is the incentive compatibility constraint, and (2) is the participation constraint.
Deﬁne uh = u(wh) and u` = u(w`). That is, uh is the utility induced by the high wage
and u` is the that generated by the low wage. Recall that g(·) denotes u−1(·). Then, we
can write the problem with agent utilities uh,u` rather than wages as the choice variables:
minuh,u` phg(uh) + (1 − ph)g(u`)
subject to : (IC) (ph − p`)(uh − u`) ≥ eu
(PC) u` + ph(uh − u`) ≥ u0 + eu.
It is immediate that the participation constraint (PC) must bind at the optimum. If
not, u` and uh can both be reduced by the same amount, leaving the incentive compatibility
constraint (IC) unaﬀected. Further, if the agent is strictly risk-averse, the solution to the
above problem is unique, with both the (IC) and (PC) constraints binding. If the agent
is also risk-neutral, there is a continuum of optimal contracts each satisfying (PC) with
equality. For ease of comparison to the risk-averse case, when the agent is risk-neutral, we
select the contract which also satisﬁes (IC) with equality.
Given an optimal high-eﬀort contract (u∗
h,u∗
`), the cost to the ﬁrm of eliciting high eﬀort
is just the expected wage, ph g(u∗
h)+(1−ph)g(u∗
`). Since the ﬁrm takes ph and p` as given,
we write c(ph,p`) to denote the cost to the ﬁrm when it wishes to induce high eﬀort.
Lemma 2 The optimal contract that elicits high eﬀort satisﬁes u` = u0 −
p`eu
(ph−p`) and
uh = u0 +
(1−p`)eu
(ph−p`) . The cost to the ﬁrm when high eﬀort is elicited is therefore
c(ph,p`) = ph g(u0 +
(1 − p`)eu
(ph − p`)




In the special case of a risk-neutral agent (i.e., with g(u) = u) the cost of inducing high
eﬀort is readily obtained to be w0 + e0. In particular, the cost is independent of ph and p`,
and is therefore invariant to the structure of the industry.
When the agent is risk-averse, however, the cost of inducing high eﬀort depends on ph
and p`. In turn, ph and p` depend on the number of other ﬁrms in the market. Thus, the
cost of inducing high eﬀort if the agent is risk-averse depends critically on the industrial
structure. With a slight abuse of notation, we refer to c(nh,n`) as the cost to an arbitrary
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eﬀort and n` ﬁrms in the industry providing low eﬀort.
We show that the cost of eﬀort is increasing in the number of both high and low quality
ﬁrms in the industry. The intuition for this result is as follows: As the number of ﬁrms in
the industry increases, the likelihood that the agent loses the sale is higher even if he puts
in high eﬀort. As a result, his wage when revenue is high must increase, else he will earn less
than his reservation utility. However, the increased diﬀerence in the wages in the high and
low revenue states exposes the agent to increased risk. If he is risk-neutral, this increase
in risk is irrelevant. However, if he is strictly risk-averse, he must be further compensated
for bearing extra risk. In this way, the “production” of eﬀort becomes more costly as the
industry grows more competitive.
Proposition 1 Suppose the agent is strictly risk-averse; that is, u00 < 0. Then, the cost of
inducing high eﬀort, c(·), strictly increases in each of nh and n`.
The excess cost of inducing high eﬀort, c(nh,n`)−[w0 +e0], may also be interpreted as
the risk-premium that must be provided to the agent to induce him to participate in the
contract. Since quality is stochastic, high eﬀort necessarily leads to uncertainty in outcomes.
A risk-averse agent must be compensated for the extra uncertainty. Of particular interest to
us going forward is the risk-premium that a monopolist must provide, or c(0,0)−[w0 +e0].
Suppose, for example, the agent has CARA utility, so that u(w) = −exp(−ρw), where
ρ is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. Then, g(u) = 1
ρ(−ln(−u)). Suppose w0 and e0
are held constant, with eu = u(w0 + e0) − u(w0) varying as ρ changes. In this case, c(0,0)
is increasing in the risk aversion coeﬃcient ρ, as is the marginal cost of eﬀort, c(0,0) − w0.
Finally, as observed earlier, with a risk-neutral agent, c(·) = w0 + e0 in all cases.
The overall decision to provide high eﬀort, of course, depends on both the beneﬁt and
cost of high eﬀort. In the next section, we consider the ﬁrst-best structure of the industry,
in which a planner who does not face incentive issues chooses the optimal industry struc-
ture, and turn to the competitive structure in Section 5. In the latter, each ﬁrm decides
independently whether to enter the industry, and, if so, which eﬀort level to provide.
4 First-Best Industry Structure
In the ﬁrst-best structure, there is no incentive problem: a planner wishing to induce high
eﬀort merely needs to compensate agents for the marginal disutility of high eﬀort, eu (the
cash equivalent of which is e0). In addition, the planner chooses the number of high and low
eﬀort ﬁrms, nh and n` to maximize social welfare. For convenience, we assume consumer
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industry proﬁt if a sale occurs.3
The consumer buys if she believes that the service will be of high quality, therefore a
sale occurs as long as at least one ﬁrm produces high quality. If there are nh ﬁrms inducing
high quality and n` ﬁrms inducing low quality, then the event that every ﬁrm produces low
quality has probability (1 − q)nhqn`. Thus, with probability 1 − (1 − q)nhqn`, at least one
ﬁrm produces high quality. Further, the cost to the planner is w0 for each low-eﬀort ﬁrm
and w0 + e0 for each high-eﬀort ﬁrm. Thus, the aggregate industry proﬁt is given by
Π(nh,n`) = [1 − qn`(1 − q)nh]y − (nh + n`)w0 − nhe0.
By deﬁnition, an industry structure with nh ﬁrms eliciting high eﬀort and n` ﬁrms
eliciting low eﬀort is ﬁrst-best if aggregate industry proﬁt cannot be improved by changing
either the number of high-eﬀort or the number of low-eﬀort ﬁrms; that is, if
Π(nh,n`) ≥ Π(˜ nh, ˜ n`) for any ˜ nh, ˜ n` ≥ 0.
It is intuitive that, if e0 is suﬃciently high (as an extreme case, consider e0 ≥ y), the
ﬁrst-best allocation would have no high-eﬀort ﬁrms. This case is uninteresting, since when
e0 is suﬃciently high, no ﬁrm in competition will choose to supply high eﬀort. Therefore,
to highlight the diﬀerence between the competitive and ﬁrst-best structures, we consider
a situation under which e0 is suﬃciently low so that the ﬁrst-best structure entails only
high-eﬀort ﬁrms.
Consider a planner who is oﬀering high quality services in an n − 1 ﬁrm industry. If he
adds one more agent, he is faced with an increased wage bill of w0 + e0. The chance that
the consumer buys the good (but did not before) is q(1−q)n−1, namely, the chance that the
ﬁrm produces high quality when all else fails. Deﬁne ˆ nf as the largest integer n for which




That is, if there are ˆ nf high-eﬀort ﬁrms in the market, adding an extra high-eﬀort ﬁrm
results in all ˆ nf + 1 ﬁrms making a loss. Clearly, a planner will never wish to have more
than ˆ nf high-eﬀort ﬁrms. In Proposition 2 below, we identify a condition under which it is
optimal for a planner to have exactly ˆ nf ﬁrms in the industry, each incurring high eﬀort.
Given our assumption that q ≥ w0+e0
y , inequality (3) that deﬁnes ˆ nf is satisﬁed for
n = 1. Further, the left-hand side decreases to zero as n gets large. Thus, a unique ˆ nf
exists, and is at least 1. Notice, also that ˆ nf is increasing in y the per customer revenue.
3It is straightforward to generalize to the case in which the consumer obtains a utility ˆ y > y from
consuming the good, with a consumer surplus ˆ y − y.
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Since 2q − 1 = q − (1 − q), B is the probability that high eﬀort generates high quality
minus the probability that low eﬀort generates high quality, divided by the probability of
high quality given low eﬀort. It summarizes the beneﬁt to a ﬁrm (in terms of increased
likelihood of high quality) of inducing high eﬀort.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the agent’s cost of eﬀort is suﬃciently low so that e0 ≤ Bw0.
Then, the ﬁrst-best allocation has ˆ nf ﬁrms in the industry, and each ﬁrm provides high
eﬀort.
The condition on e0 is intuitive: To ensure that all ﬁrms producing high quality is ﬁrst
best, it must be the case that for an industry of size ˆ nf, it is not in the central planner’s
best interest to convert a worker’s contract to one that induces low eﬀort. If the central
planner does so, then he saves the eﬀort cost, e0, but reduces the probability of success.
This eﬀect is captured by the B term, which relates to the marginal beneﬁt (in terms of
higher probability) of inducing high eﬀort. The condition in the proposition is conservative;
a tighter suﬃcient condition is e0
y ≤ (2q − 1)(1 − q)ˆ nf
. From condition (3), ˆ nf depends on
w0,e0, and y. We show in the proof of Proposition 2 that the requirement that e0
w0 ≤ B is
suﬃcient to ensure that the cost of eﬀort is low compared to the revenue potential y.
5 Racing to the Bottom
Do market forces “work” in service industries? If the ﬁrst-best industry structure entails
only high-eﬀort ﬁrms, will competition lead to the same outcome? There are two reasons
why competition may yield an outcome divergent from the ﬁrst-best one. First, if the
agent is risk-averse, the incentive problem has bite, and the cost to a ﬁrm in equilibrium
of inducing high eﬀort is higher than the corresponding cost to a central planner. Second,
even controlling for the incentive cost, too many ﬁrms may wish to enter the industry in
equilibrium.
Our focus here is on the latter eﬀect, which represents a race to the bottom in the
industry.4 To distinguish between the two eﬀects, we consider equilibria in both the short
4It is straightforward that, if the agent is suﬃciently risk-averse, a ﬁrm subject to an incentive problem
may wish to induce low eﬀort whereas a ﬁrm which does not face such a problem is willing to induce high
eﬀort.
10and long run. In the short-run, every ﬁrm in the industry must earn a non-negative proﬁt,
and must be satisﬁed with its own eﬀort (i.e., it should not be able to increase its expected
proﬁt by switching eﬀort). However, new ﬁrms cannot enter the market, so that ﬁrms in
the industry may earn positive proﬁts. In the long-run, no ﬁrm must be willing to enter the
market at either eﬀort level. In other words, existing ﬁrms must make close to zero proﬁts.5
Since ﬁrms in the short-run face the same incentive problem as ﬁrms in the long-run, any
divergence between a short-run outcome and a long-run one must be due to excess entry.
Recall that the proﬁt of an individual ﬁrm in an industry with nh + n` + 1 ﬁrms is
πi(nh,n`) =
(
ph(nh,n`)y − c(nh,n`) if ﬁrm i provides high eﬀort
p`(nh,n`)y − w0 if ﬁrm i provides low eﬀort.
We ﬁrst deﬁne short-run equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 In a short-run industry equilibrium with nh ﬁrms inducing high eﬀort and
n` ﬁrms inducing low eﬀort then
(i) No high eﬀort ﬁrm wishes to either switch to low eﬀort or to exit: If nh ≥ 1, then
ph(nh − 1,n`)y − c(nh − 1,n`) ≥ max{p`(nh − 1,n`)y − w0 , 0}.
(ii) No low quality ﬁrm wishes to either switch to high quality or to exit: If n` ≥ 1, then
p`(nh,n` − 1)y − w0 ≥ max{ph(nh1,n` − 1)y − c(nh,n` − 1) , 0}.
Next, consider long-run equilibrium. In the long run, there are no barriers to entry, and
ﬁrms can continue to enter as long as positive proﬁts are available.
Deﬁnition 2 A long-run equilibrium with nh ﬁrms inducing high eﬀort and n` ﬁrms in-
ducing low is a short-run equilibrium with the additional provision that no new ﬁrm wishes
to enter the market at either eﬀort level:
ph(nh,n`)y − c(nh,n`) ≤ 0 and p`(nh,n`)y − w0 ≤ 0.
Our goal here is not to characterize all equilibria of the game, but rather to consider
situations under which competitive equilibria do not implement the ﬁrst best. We consider
an extreme divergence between outcomes in the short and long run, under which competition
leads to all ﬁrms supplying high eﬀort in the short run, but following the entry of new ﬁrms,
5An integer number of ﬁrms may preclude exactly zero proﬁts for industry participants.
11each ﬁrm in the industry provides low eﬀort in the long run. In this case, ﬁrm entry directly
reduces the average quality of the industry. More broadly, of course, there will be parameter
values for which the industry in either the short or long run may have a mix of high and
low eﬀort ﬁrms. We focus on the extremes to make our point more cleanly.
First, consider the short run. If competing ﬁrms produce high quality, then the industry
size must be suﬃciently small. We identify a threshold number of ﬁrms such that each ﬁrm
in the industry supplies high eﬀort if the short-run number of ﬁrms is less than the threshold.
Deﬁne ˆ nc
s as the largest integer n to satisfy













The two parts of the RHS come from the joint requirements that ﬁrms producing high
quality do not switch to low quality and secondly, do not exit. From Lemma 1, we know
that the LHS of (4) is declining in n, and it goes to zero as n gets large. From Proposition
1, both terms on the RHS are increasing in n. Thus, if the condition is satisﬁed at n = 1,
there exists a unique ˆ nc
s greater than or equal to one. Further, the condition is also satisﬁed
by all n < ˆ nc
s. Notice also that the more risk-averse the agent, the faster the RHS of (4)
increases. Thus, increasing risk aversion on the part of the agent leads to a weakly lower
ˆ nc
s.
The maximum number of ﬁrms that the industry can sustain is determined by a zero
proﬁt condition. In the long-run, if the industry has ˆ nc
` ﬁrms and each ﬁrm supplies low
eﬀort, and no new ﬁrms wish to enter then ˆ nc
` is the largest integer that satisﬁes




Note that the left-hand side is declining in n. Thus, if there are ˆ nc
` low-eﬀort ﬁrms in the
industry, and an extra low eﬀort ﬁrm were to enter, each ﬁrm would make a loss, since
p`(0,n)y < w0.
We next identify suﬃcient conditions for there to be a stark divergence between short-run
and long-run equilibrium outcomes: in the short-run, each ﬁrm induces high eﬀort, whereas
in the long-run, each ﬁrm supplies low eﬀort. Essentially, high eﬀort in the short-run entails
a suﬃciently low cost of eﬀort; conversely, low eﬀort in the long-run entails a suﬃciently
high cost of eﬀort. The next proposition formalizes these arguments by identifying bounds
for the cost of eﬀort under which both phenomena obtain.









y ≤ q. Then,
if the number of ﬁrms in short run equilibrium is no greater than ˆ nc
s each ﬁrm supplies high
12eﬀort. However, there is a long-run equilibrium with ˆ nc
` > ˆ nc
s ﬁrms, each supplying low
eﬀort.
In the proposition, condition (ii) merely ensures that a monopolist earns a non-negative
proﬁt by inducing high quality. The expression
c(0,0)−w0
y in condition (i) measures the extra
cost to a monopolist of providing incentives per unit revenue. The upper bound of (i) ensures
that a monopolist earns a higher proﬁt from high quality, as compared to low quality. The
lower bound in condition (i) ensures that, in the long-run, a ﬁrm would rather supply low










. A suﬃcient condition is found by requiring the
inequality to hold at ˆ nc
` = 2, and considering c(0,0) rather than c(ˆ nc
`−1,0) on the left-hand
side.





2 ,(2q − 1)
i
. Fix y and pick a value of e0 to satisfy this condition; condition
(ii) then merely requires that w0 + e0 ≤ qy, which is easily arranged by choosing w0 to be
suﬃciently low. Thus, even when the agent is risk-neutral (so that the incentive problem
is irrelevant), there can be a divergence between a short-run equilibrium and a long-run
equilibrium. This divergence is highlighted via an example in Section 5.1.
Under which conditions do the ﬁrst-best solution and the competitive outcome diverge?
Again, we focus on extreme outcomes, in which the ﬁrst-best outcome entails all ﬁrms
supplying high eﬀort and yet, in long-run equilibrium all ﬁrms supply low eﬀort. Putting
together the conditions from Propositions 2 and 3 provides the requirements for such a
divergence. As with Proposition 3, condition (i) in the proposition below is conservative.













2 , and (ii) e0 ≤ w0B. Then, the ﬁrst-best so-
lution has ˆ nf ﬁrms, each providing high eﬀort. However, there exists a long-run equilibrium
that has ˆ nc
` ﬁrms, each providing low eﬀort.
There are two eﬀects that cause competition to diverge from the ﬁrst best. First,
suppose the agent is risk-neutral, so that the principal can costlessly align the agent’s




after Proposition 3, this condition is conservative). With a risk-neutral agent, the race to
lower eﬀort occurs entirely due to a reduction in the beneﬁt of high eﬀort, analogous to
the “business stealing” eﬀect identiﬁed by Raith (2003). As the number of ﬁrms increases,
the beneﬁt accruing to a ﬁrm of inducing eﬀort decreases. If all other ﬁrms produce high
quality then each ﬁrm’s revenue will be proportional to 1
n. Therefore, for ﬁxed costs, the
13beneﬁt of high eﬀort declines and free entry drives ﬁrms to produce low quality because of
declining expected beneﬁt.
However, in addition to this revenue eﬀect, we identify a cost externality: With a
risk-averse agent, increasing the number of competitors increases the cost to each ﬁrm of
providing incentives, by reducing the likelihood of achieving a high revenue. This cost is
important, because it determines how “quickly” the industry diverges from ﬁrst best.
To emphasize the eﬀect of agent risk-aversion, we explicitly consider a situation in which,
with a risk-neutral agent, there exists a long-run equilibrium with all ﬁrms providing high
eﬀort. However, with suﬃciently risk-averse agents, there is a long-run equilibrium with
each ﬁrm providing low eﬀort.
Deﬁne ˆ nh to be the largest integer that satisﬁes

1 − (1 − q)n
n

y ≥ w0 + e0. (6)
Since qy > w0 + e0 by assumption, ˆ nh exists and weakly exceeds one.
If e0 is suﬃciently low, there exists a long-run equilibrium with ˆ nh ﬁrms in the market,
each supplying high eﬀort. However, even at the low cost of eﬀort in a world with certainty,
if the agent is suﬃciently risk-averse, there is a long-run equilibrium in which each ﬁrm
supplies low eﬀort.
Proposition 5 There exists an ¯ e > 0 such that, if e0
y ≤ ¯ e and the agent is risk-neutral, it
is a long-run equilibrium for there to be ˆ nh ﬁrms in the market, each supplying high eﬀort.




2 , it is a long-run equilibrium for
there to be ˆ nc
` ﬁrms in the market, each supplying low eﬀort.
It is intuitive that when e0 (the cost of eﬀort to a ﬁrm employing a risk-neutral agent)
is low, an equilibrium will entail high-eﬀort ﬁrms. As mentioned in Section 3, the quantity
[c(0,0) − w0] represents the marginal cost to a monopolist of inducing high eﬀort, and
increases in the risk-aversion of the agent. To see this, suppose that the agent has CARA
utility. For any ﬁxed e0 that satisﬁes the ﬁrst part of the proposition, if the coeﬃcient of
risk aversion is suﬃciently high, there will be a long-run equilibrium with only low-eﬀort
ﬁrms.
5.1 Example
To illustrate our results, we consider the following numeric example. Let q = 0.7, y = 1,
w0 = 0.08, and e0 = 0.11. At these parameter values, ˆ nf = 2 and ˆ nc
` = 12. We demonstrate
that even with risk-neutral agents, there exists a long-run equilibrium with low-eﬀort ﬁrms,
14along with a long-run equilibrium with high-eﬀort ﬁrms. When the agent is suﬃciently
risk-averse, the high-eﬀort equilibrium no longer exists.
Notice that e0 = 0.11 > w0B = 0.1067, so the condition of Proposition 2 is not satisﬁed.
However, as mentioned, this condition represents a loose upper bound; the exact condition
is e0
y ≤ (2q − 1)(1 − q)ˆ nf−1 = 0.12, which is satisﬁed. Therefore, the ﬁrst-best outcome
entails two high-eﬀort ﬁrms in the industry, and no low-eﬀort ﬁrms.
The optimality of two high-eﬀort ﬁrms when there is no incentive problem may be
checked directly. The industry proﬁt in the ﬁrst-best case is given by [1−(1−q)2]y−2(w0+
e0) = 0.53. Switching one ﬁrm to low-eﬀort yields a proﬁt [1−q(1−q)]y−2w0 −e0 = 0.52.
Removing one ﬁrm entirely yields a proﬁt qy −(w0 +e0) = 0.51. Adding a third high-eﬀort
ﬁrm yields [1 − (1 − q)3]y − 3(w0 + e0) = 0.40. Finally, adding a third ﬁrm that provides
low-eﬀort yields a proﬁt [1−q(1−q)2]y−3w0 −2e0 = 0.48. Thus, it is optimal to have two
high-eﬀort ﬁrms, and no low-eﬀort ﬁrms.
Now, suppose the agent is risk-neutral. Then, from condition (4), ˆ nc
s = 5. Note that
condition (i) of Proposition 3 is violated, since e0
y = 0.11 <
(1−q2)B
2 = 0.34. However, as
mentioned in the text, the right-hand side of the condition represents a loose lower bound







B = 0.1096. Thus, there
is a long-run equilibrium with 12 low-eﬀort ﬁrms and no high-eﬀort ﬁrms in the market.
Note that, when the agent is risk-neutral, a ﬁrm in equilibrium incurs the same eﬀort
cost as the central planner. That is, the incentive problem has no bite. Nevertheless,
the example shows that there is a divergence between the ﬁrst-best outcome and long-run
equilibrium. In the long-run, too many ﬁrms enter the industry, causing all ﬁrms to switch
to low eﬀort.
Next, suppose the agent has CARA utility with risk-aversion coeﬃcient 1,that is, her
utility over consumption is deﬁned by u(w) = −e−w. Now, the marginal cost of high
eﬀort exceeds e0 at each industry conﬁguration, reducing the proﬁt from providing high
eﬀort. Thus, ˆ nc
s falls to 3. The long-run equilibrium in which all ﬁrms provide low-eﬀort is
unaﬀected.
These results are illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the proﬁt of ﬁrm i when all other
ﬁrms in the industry are providing high eﬀort (left-hand panel) and low eﬀort (right-hand
panel).
Consider the left-hand panel of Figure 1 ﬁrst. If all other ﬁrms in the industry are
providing high eﬀort, and the agent is risk-neutral, it is a best response for ﬁrm i to also
provide high eﬀort as long as the number of other ﬁrms in the industry is 4 or less. When
there are 5 other ﬁrms in the industry, ﬁrm i makes a loss regardless of the eﬀort level it
provides. Thus, it is a long-run equilibrium for there to be exactly 5 high-eﬀort ﬁrms in















































Number of other low−effort firms
Figure 1: Firm proﬁts in short-run and long-run equilibrium
the industry. Conversely, if the agent is risk-averse as described above, the proﬁt from high
eﬀort is lower: now, high eﬀort is a best response only if the number of other ﬁrms in the
industry is 2 or lower.
Next, consider the right-hand panel. If all other ﬁrms in the industry provide low eﬀort,
and the agent is risk-neutral, it is a best response for ﬁrm i to provide high eﬀort if there are
10 or fewer other ﬁrms, but to switch to low eﬀort when there are 11 other ﬁrms. Thus, it
is a long-run equilibrium for there to be 12 low-eﬀort ﬁrms in the market. Therefore, when
the agent is risk-neutral, there exist multiple long-run equilibria: one in which all ﬁrms
provide high eﬀort, and another in which all ﬁrms provide low eﬀort. In the short-run, if 6
or fewer other ﬁrms provide low eﬀort, it is a best response to provide high eﬀort.
Therefore, in this example:
• The ﬁrst-best outcome has 2 high-eﬀort ﬁrms.
• There is a long-run equilibrium with 12 low-eﬀort ﬁrms, regardless of the agent’s
preferences.
• When the agent is risk-neutral, there is a long-run equilibrium with 5 high-eﬀort ﬁrms,
and short-run equilibria with 5 or fewer high-eﬀort ﬁrms.
16• When the agent is risk-averse with CARA coeﬃcient 1, there are short-run equilibria
with 3 or fewer high-eﬀort ﬁrms.
6 Conclusion
Competition in this environment can induce a race to the bottom, and reduce welfare. At
some point competitive forces encourage too much entry which leads to a lower average
industry quality. As ﬁrms enter the market, they reduce the incentives of existing ﬁrms to
produce high quality and also are more likely to introduce low quality goods.
That competition in service industries has pernicious eﬀects has a number of policy
implications. First, barriers to entry may be a good thing. Speciﬁcally trade restrictions
or professional accreditations that prevent entry or reduce supply may result in higher
quality. Since eﬀort is positively correlated with quality, the implication of Proposition
3 is that, if the marginal cost of high eﬀort is suﬃciently high (but not high enough to
entirely preclude provision of eﬀort), the average quality of the service oﬀered will be low
in long-run equilibrium, but may be high in the short-run. Thus, in sectors identiﬁable
with costly eﬀort, prevention of entry may preserve a high average quality across ﬁrms.
For example, industry associations in professions such as accountancy, law, and medicine,
are often accused of erecting barriers to entry in an eﬀort to keep supply low. Our model
provides a justiﬁcation for such barriers: in their absence, the average quality of the service
would plummet.
Second, the proponents of government “outsourcing” argue that opening up competition
in the provision of services generates service provision at a lower cost. This model suggests
that there is another externality at work, namely that an increase in competition in a service
industry may actually decrease the quality of the good. If quality is diﬃcult to measure it
suggests that monopoly or restricted provision may be optimal if quality is an issue.
Finally, the health care market is one service industry that has befuddled most high
income countries. Aside from anecdotal evidence, there is some indication that increased
competition has generated worse outcomes: Propper, Burgess and Gossage (2003) conclude
that competition has led to lower quality in the provision of health services by the National
Health Service in the UK.
This is a very stylized model, but the intuition that competing ﬁrms can make it more
expensive to elicit high eﬀort in service industries is robust. Whether that results in equi-
librium lower eﬀort levels depends, of course on the beneﬁt to the principal in so doing.
Unreported in this paper, we have also considered a model in which the revenue generated
by a transaction depends on the number of ﬁrms in the industry. The results go through
17(albeit with more parameter restrictions). In sum, increased competition in any industry
with risk-averse employees oﬀering services may be susceptible to a race to the bottom.
7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Recall that ph is deﬁned as ph(nh,n`) = q
Pnh+n`
k=0 ψ(k | nh,n`) 1
k+1. Therefore, ph(·) is
the expectation of a random variable which takes on values in the set with { 1
nh+n`+1, 1
nh+n`,...,1},
and the density at 1
k+1 is given by ψ(k | nh,n`).
We will show that the distribution generated by ψ(· | ˜ nh, ˜ n`) ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates the distribution generated by ψ(· | nh,n`) whenever either ˜ nh < nh or ˜ n` < n`,
or both.
First, consider the binomial distribution over {0,...,n}, with success probability p. Let




pk(1−p)n−k denote the density at k and let Φ(· | n,p) denote the associated
distribution.






pi(1 − p)k−i. Hence,


















whenever n ≥ i + 1.
Therefore,















We can now write






























= p(1 − p)n > 0.
Therefore, the distribution Φ(· | n + 1,p) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates by Φ(· | n,p).
Now, notice that ψ(k | nh,n`) =
Pmin{k,n`}
j=max{k−nh,0} φ(k − j | nh,q) φ(j | n`,(1 − q)). Let
Ψ(k | nh,n`) =
Pk
i=0 ψ(i | nh,n`) be the probability that at least k of the remaining ﬁrms
are high quality.
Suppose one additional high-eﬀort ﬁrm enters the market, so that the number of high-
eﬀort ﬁrms (other than ﬁrm i, which we are interested in) increases from nh to nh+1, while
the number of other low quality ﬁrms remains ﬁxed at n`. Note that φ(· | n`,(1 − q)) is
unchanged, whereas Φ(k − j | nh + 1,q) < Φ(k − j,| nh,q) for all (k − j) ∈ {0,···,nh}.
Since the last inequality holds for all j ∈ {max{0,k − nh},···,min{k,n`}}, it follows that
18Ψ(k | nh + 1,n`) < Ψ(k | nh,n`) for all k ∈ {0,···,nh + n`}. It follows immediately that
ph(·) is strictly decreasing in nh.
A similar argument shows that ph(·) is strictly decreasing in n`.
Now, p`(nh,n`) =
1−q
q ph(nh,n`), and ph(nh,n`) − p`(nh,n`) = (2 − 1
q)ph(nh,n`). Since
ph(·) is strictly decreasing in nh and n`, so are p` and ph − p`.
Proof of Lemma 2
First, suppose the agent is strictly risk-averse. Then, the objective function phg(uh) +
(1−ph)g(u`) is strictly convex. From the arguments in the text, the participation constraint
(PC) must bind. If the IC does not bind, the ﬁrst-order conditions imply that g0(uh) =
g0(u`), or uh = u`. However, a constant wage will violate the IC constraint. Therefore, the
IC constraint must bind.
Next, suppose the agent is risk-neutral. Then, any uh,u` which Then, any u`,uh that
exactly satisfy the PC result in the same cost (u0). Thus, any pair (uh,u`) that exactly
satisfy the PC and weakly satisfy the IC represent an optimal contract. In particular, the
solution obtained when both constraints bind is optimal.
When both IC and PC bind, solving the two equations simultaneously yields the utilities
exhibited in the statement of the Lemma. The expected cost to the ﬁrm is the expected
wage, and is given by
c(ph,p`) = ph g(u0 +
(1 − p`)eu
(ph − p`)




Proof of Proposition 1
The cost of inducing high eﬀort is
c(nh,n`) = phg(u0 +
(1 − p`)eu
ph − p`




where ph,p` are functions of nh and n`.
Since p`(nh,n`) =
1−q
q ph(nh,n`) for every pair (nh,n`) it follows that ph − p` =
2q−1
q ph
and (1 − p`) =
q−(1−q)ph
q , where we suppress the dependence on nh,n` for brevity. Substi-
tuting these expressions into (7),
c(nh,n`) = ph g

u0 +
(q − (1 − q)ph)eu
(2q − 1)ph)








Let uh = u0 +
(q−(1−q)ph)eu





= g(uh) − g(u`) + phg0(uh)
∂uh
∂ph













= g(uh) − g(u`) − g0(uh)(uh − u`).
Now, given g(u(w)) = w for every w, it follows that g0(u(w))u0(w) = 1. Since u0(·) > 0,
it further follows that g0(·) > 0.
Further, g00(u0)2 + g0u00 = 0, or g00(u(w)) = −
g0(u(w))u00(w)
(u0(w))2 for every w. Now, since









Now, from Lemma 1, ph is strictly decreasing in nh and n`. Thus, c(·) is strictly
increasing in each of nh and n`.
Proof of Proposition 2
Notice that the aggregate industry proﬁt is concave in nh and n`. Thus, it is suﬃcient
to consider a situation in which all ﬁrms are producing high eﬀort, and show that local
changes in the number of high and low eﬀort ﬁrms do not increase proﬁt.
Suppose, therefore, that the ﬁrst-best industry structure consists of n ﬁrms, each pro-
ducing high eﬀort. Then, the following four conditions must hold:
(i) Increasing the number of high eﬀort ﬁrms to n + 1 must not increase proﬁt. That is,
[1 − (1 − q)n]y − n(w0 + e0) ≥ [1 − (1 − q)n+1]y − (n + 1)(w0 + e0),
or, q(1 − q)ny ≤ w0 + e0. (8)
Now, ˆ nf is deﬁned as the largest integer n for which q(1 − q)n−1 ≥ w0+e0
y . Thus, if there
are ˆ nf ﬁrms in the industry, q(1 − q)ny < w0 + e0, so that (8) holds.
(ii) Reducing the number of high eﬀort ﬁrms to n − 1 must not increase proﬁt. That is,
[1 − (1 − q)n]y − n(w0 + e0) ≥ [1 − (1 − q)n−1]y − (n − 1)(w0 + e0),
or, q(1 − q)n−1y ≥ w0 + e0, (9)
which holds at n = ˆ nf, given the deﬁnition of ˆ nf.
20(iii) Switching a high eﬀort ﬁrm to a low eﬀort ﬁrm does not improve proﬁt. That is,
[1 − (1 − q)n]y − n(w0 + e0) ≥ [1 − q(1 − q)n−1]y − (n − 1)(w0 + e0) − w0,
or, (2q − 1)(1 − q)n−1y ≥ e0, (10)
We have assumed that e0 ≤
2q−1










Further, by deﬁnition of ˆ nf,
q(1 − q)ˆ nf−1y ≥ e0 + w0,
or (1 − q)ˆ nf−1y ≥ e0+w0
q . Since e0+w0
q ≥ e0
2q−1, it follows that (1 − q)ˆ nf−1y ≥ e0
2q−1, so that
condition (10) holds.
(iv) Adding a low eﬀort ﬁrm does not improve proﬁt. That is,
[1 − (1 − q)n]y − n(w0 + e0) ≥ [1 − q(1 − q)n]y − n(w0 + e0) − w0,
or, (1 − q)n+1y ≤ w0. (11)
We show that (11) is satisﬁed, given (8) and (10). Multiply (10) by −1 and add to (8).
This directly yields (11), which is therefore satisﬁed.
Thus, if there are exactly ˆ nf high-eﬀort ﬁrms and zero low-eﬀort ﬁrms in the industry
and e0 ≤ Bw0, a local change in either the number of high or low eﬀort ﬁrms does not
increase aggregate proﬁt. Since the aggregate industry proﬁt is concave in nh,n`, the ﬁrst-
best solution has ˆ nf ﬁrms in the industry, each producing high eﬀort.
Proof of Proposition 3
First, we show that it is a long-run equilibrium for ˆ nc
` ﬁrms in the market to each supply
low eﬀort. By deﬁnition of ˆ nc
`, no new ﬁrm wishes to enter the market and supply low eﬀort.
Also, by deﬁnition of ˆ nc
`, no ﬁrm wishes to exit the market, since each ﬁrm earns a weakly
positive proﬁt.
Thus, we need to check the following two conditions:
(i) No ﬁrm in the industry wishes to switch from low to high eﬀort. No ﬁrm will switch in
this manner if
ph(0, ˆ nc
` − 1)y − c(0, ˆ nc
` − 1) ≤ p`(0, ˆ nc
` − 1)y − w0. (12)




`−1), the above inequality can be re-written as
2q−1
1−q p`(0, ˆ nc
`−
1)y ≤ c(0, ˆ nc
` − 1) − w0. Now, note that p`(0, ˆ nc




n , and (from Proposition 1)
21c(0, ˆ nc
` − 1) ≥ c(0,0). Thus, (12) is satisﬁed if










It is straightforward to see that, for n ≥ 1, the expression
1−qn
n is decreasing in n. Hence,
if condition (13) is satisﬁed for ˆ nc
` = 2, it is satisﬁed for all higher ˆ nc
`. When ˆ nc
` = 2, the






2 , which is assumed in
the statement of the Proposition.
(ii) No ﬁrm wishes to enter and supply high eﬀort. That is,
ph(0, ˆ nc
`)y − c(0, ˆ nc
`) ≤ 0. (14)
Note that (12) can be written as
[ph(0, ˆ nc
` − 1) − p`(0, ˆ nc
` − 1)]y ≤ c(0, ˆ nc
` − 1) − w0.
Since [ph(·)−p`(·)] is decreasing in both arguments and c(·) is increasing in both arguments,
it follows that
[ph(0, ˆ nc
`) − p`(0, ˆ nc
`)]y ≤ c(0, ˆ nc
`) − w0. (15)
Further, p`(0, ˆ nc
`)y < w0 by deﬁnition of ˆ nc
`. Add this last inequality to (15), and we obtain
(14). Therefore, no ﬁrm wishes to enter and supply high eﬀort.
Hence, there exists a long-run equilibrium with ˆ nc
` ﬁrms in the market, each supplying
low eﬀort. Notice that the argument above implies that a suﬃcient condition for there to
exist a long-run equilibrium with ˆ nc





Next, we show that if there are n ≤ ˆ nc
s in the market in the short-run, each ﬁrm will
supply high eﬀort. There are two conditions we need to check:
(i) No ﬁrm wishes to switch from high to low quality; that is,
ph(n − 1,0)y − c(n − 1,0) ≥ p`(n − 1,0)y − w0.
This last condition reduces to
2q−1
q ph(n − 1,0)y ≥ c(n − 1,0) − w0, which is satisﬁed by
deﬁnition of ˆ nc
s. For ˆ nc
s to weakly exceed one, the condition must be satisﬁed at n = 1.
Since ph(0,0) = q, this requires c(0,0)−w0 ≤ (2q −1)y, or
c(0,0)−w0
y ≤ (1−q)B, which has
been assumed.
(ii) No ﬁrm wishes to exit the market; that is,
ph(n − 1,0)y ≥ c(n − 1,0) (16)
22This condition is again satisﬁed by deﬁnition of ˆ nc
s. For ˆ nc
s to weakly exceed one, the
condition must be satisﬁed at n = 1, which implies that c(0,0) ≤ qy.
Finally, we show that ˆ nc
s < ˆ nc
`. For this to hold, it is suﬃcient that, if there are ˆ nc
` ﬁrms
in the industry each supplying high eﬀort, each ﬁrm makes a loss; that is, ph(ˆ nc
` − 1,0) <
c(ˆ nc
`−1,0)







. Thus, a suﬃcient condition for ˆ nc











y . Since c(·) is strictly increasing in both arguments (from
Proposition 1), it is suﬃcient that








Further, from the deﬁnition of ˆ nc
`, it must be that p`(0, ˆ nc



















The RHS is declining in ˆ nc
`, so it is suﬃcient if the RHS holds at ˆ nc




2 . However, by assumption
c(0,0)−w0




2 . Hence, ˆ nc
s < ˆ nc
`.
Proof of Proposition 4
As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, the condition e0
y ≤ w0B is suﬃcient for the
ﬁrst-best to have ˆ nf high-eﬀort ﬁrms and no low-eﬀort ﬁrms.
Further, as shown in the proof of Proposition 3, a suﬃcient condition for there to exist








. Since the right-
hand side of this last inequality is decreasing in ˆ nc





provided that ˆ nc
` ≥ 2. Condition (ii) in the statement of the Proposition ensures that
ˆ nc
` ≥ 2: Since
1−q2
2 = p`(0,1), the condition implies that p`(0,1)y ≥ w0.
Proof of Proposition 5





for there to exist a long-run equilibrium with ˆ nc
` ﬁrms, each supplying low eﬀort. Thus,
what remains to be proved is the ﬁrst part of the Proposition.
Suppose the agent is risk-neutral. Note that ˆ nh may also be deﬁned as the largest integer
n for which
ph(n − 1,0)y ≥ w0 + e0.
Thus, it follows that
ph(ˆ nh − 1,0)y − (w0 + e0) ≥ 0 ≥ ph(ˆ nh,0)y − (w0 + e0).
23Therefore, if there are ˆ nh ﬁrms in the industry, each supplying high eﬀort, no existing ﬁrm
has an incentive to leave the industry, and no new ﬁrm has an incentive to enter and supply
high eﬀort.
We therefore need to check that no existing ﬁrm wishes to switch to low eﬀort, and no
new ﬁrm wishes to enter and supply low eﬀort. We check each of these in turn.
(i) If an existing ﬁrm switches to low eﬀort, its proﬁt is p`(ˆ nh − 1,0)y − w0 =
1−q
q ph(ˆ nh −
1,0)y − w0. For such a deviation to be ruled out, we need




≤ ph(ˆ nh − 1,0) − p`(ˆ nh − 1,0). (19)
Deﬁne




1 − (1 − q)ˆ nh+1
ˆ nh + 1
#
Since the term [ph(·)−p`(·)] is strictly decreasing in both arguments (Lemma 1), it follows
that ¯ e < ph(ˆ nh − 1,0) − p`(ˆ nh − 1,0). Thus, if e0
y ≤ ¯ e, condition (19) is satisﬁed, and no
existing ﬁrm has an incentive to switch to low eﬀort.
(ii) Suppose e0
y ≤ ¯ e; that is,
e0 ≤ [ph(ˆ nh,0) − p`(ˆ nh,0)]y. (20)
In addition, from the deﬁnition of ˆ nh,
w0 + e0 > ph(ˆ nh,0)y. (21)
Multiply (20) by −1 and add to (21), to obtain
w0 > p`(ˆ nh,0)y.
That is, no new ﬁrm can enter with low eﬀort and earn a non-negative proﬁt.
Therefore, if e0
y < ¯ e and the agent is risk-neutral, it is a long-run equilibrium for there
to be ˆ nh ﬁrms in the industry, each supplying high eﬀort.
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